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Lawyers, Accountants, and the Battle to
Own Professional Services
Gary A. Munneke*
Competition between lawyers and accountants is not a new
concept.1 At various times during the past century, these two
professions have clashed over the scope and definition of their
respective services. Lawyers traditionally have relied upon a
professional monopoly to provide "legal" services as a device to
exclude nonlawyers from the practice of law. 2 Supported by
statutes in many jurisdictions making the unauthorized prac-
tice of law a criminal offense3 and ethics rules prohibiting law-
yers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, 4
lawyers have always been able to identify some inner sanctum
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York.
This material was originally distributed as part of a program on Multidisciplinary
Practice at the 24th Annual ABA Conference on Professional Responsibility on
May 28, 1998, in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. A form of this material subsequently
appeared in an earlier publication. See Gary A. Munneke, Lawyers, Accountants
and the Battle to Own Professional Services, SYMP. ISSUE PROF. LAw., 63 (1998).
The author wishes to thank Leonard Klingbaum and Amanda Waters for their
assistance in preparing this article.
1. The existence of this professional monopoly has been the subject of criti-
cism in the legal literature. See John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play: As Accountants Edge
into the Legal Market Lawyers May Find Themselves Blindsided by the Assault but
Also Limited by Professional Rules, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42.
2. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional
and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1,
3-5 (1981); Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good
Fences Really Make Good Neighbors - or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 159, 166-68.
3. See, e.g., N.Y. JuD. LAw §§ 476, 478, 484 (McKinney 1983).
4. RULE 5.5 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
"A lawyer shall not:
(a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of
the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of
activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1999).
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of professional services that only they could handle.5 Because of
jurisdictional differences in both substantive and procedural
law, state-by-state licensing of lawyers created a somewhat bal-
kanized practice milieu, notwithstanding the fact that many ar-
eas of practice were based on federal, rather than state, law.6
Accountants, on the other hand, have always enjoyed a na-
tional or even international scope to their practice. While laws
differ from state to state, numbers and bookkeeping practices do
not; generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") mean
that an accountant in California can audit the books of a com-
pany or individual in her own state, New York, or Singapore. 7
In smaller towns and cities, the ways accountants and cer-
tified public accountants ("CPAs") conduct their practices is
similar to the way lawyers practice law. Both in terms of the
size of firms and types of clients, law and accounting are often
characterized as cottage industries. In larger metropolitan ar-
eas however, where the clients are frequently large national or
international corporations, the nature of accounting practice
has fostered the development of a handful of powerful industry-
dominating accounting firms.8 These firms have been able to
cross state and national boundaries to provide services to cli-
ents much more easily than law firms constrained by local prac-
tice and ethics rules, which today continue to tie law firms and
5. See Kathleen Eleanor Justice, Note, There Goes the Monopoly: The Califor-
nia Proposal to Allow Nonlawyers to Practice Law, 44 VAND. L. REV. 179, 181
(1991).
6. Although an argument supporting national licensing of lawyers can be
made, the fundamental concept of self-regulation of the legal profession has
evolved through the offices of state supreme courts, which oversee admission to
practice, lawyer discipline and other regulatory functions. The inertia of this well-
entrenched system is unlikely to change, despite the fact that licensing on a state-
by-state basis impedes lawyer mobility. Moreover, according to one commentator,
restraints on interjurisdictional practice by lawyers infringe on multidisciplinary
practice as well. See Anthony E. Davis, Remarks at the American Bar Association
Annual Meeting (August 9, 1999).
7. See ANTHONY PHILLIPS ET AL., BASIc ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 43-61 (4th
ed. 1988).
8. See Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for
Law Firms: Why Multi-Discipline Practices Should Be Permitted in the United
States, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 190, 250 (1997).
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the legal profession to fairly narrow boundaries defining the
role of lawyers. 9
In other ways, the professions of accounting and law have
encountered similar changes. Beginning in the late 1970s, both
accountants and lawyers were freed from restrictions on active
client development. 10 Both professions have had to cope with
rapid societal change from a revolution in technology to a
globalization of economies that has swept through the business
world.1 Both professions have faced increased litigation con-
cerning the quality and effectiveness of their services.' 2
In the freewheeling business environment of the 1980s and
90s, accountants and lawyers have found themselves increas-
ingly drawn into direct competition with each other for client
business. 3 It still may be the case that most small business
owners select CPAs to get their books audited and a lawyer to
draft articles of incorporation, or that an individual chooses an
accountant to do her taxes and a lawyer to handle her divorce.
In the world of large corporations playing on an international
stage, however, the line between the practice of law and the
practice of accountancy may not be as easy to discern.
Lawyers traditionally possessed a monopoly on the right to
represent clients in court.' 4 The natural extensions of this mo-
nopoly included the work associated with drafting legal docu-
ments and dispensing legal advice. However, this monopoly has
never been absolute. Litigants have always had the right to
represent themselves pro se, and lay representation of individu-
9. Lawyers can only practice in jurisdictions where they are licensed, and re-
alistically most lawyers are licensed in one, or no more than a few, states.
10. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982), Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
11. See ABA Special Commission Endorses MDP with Conditions, 3 PROF.
RESP. NEWS: SPECIAL MDP EDITION 2, 2 (1999).
12. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn.
1980); Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987); Credit Alliance Corp.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.
v. Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1992); Ron-
son v. Talesnick, 33 F. Supp. 2d 347 (D.N.J. 1999); National Credit Union Admin.
Bd. v. Aho, Henshue & Hall, Civ. A. No. 90-4443, 1991 WL 174671 (E.D. La. Au-
gust 30, 1991); Locicero v. Leslie, 948 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1996).
13. See Anthony E. Davis, The Draft to Multidisciplinary Practice, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 2, 1998, at 3.
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 2, TITLE B
(Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998); see generally Rhode, supra note 2, at 11-12.
1999]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
als before certain administrative tribunals is commonly al-
lowed. 15 Guardians and trustees representing the interests of
others are not always lawyers. It is possible to practice before
the United States Patent Office without graduating from law
school. 16 Accountants have long been permitted to practice
before United States tax courts representing taxpayers. 17
Mediation, arbitration, and other forms of alternative dis-
pute resolution have diluted the lawyer's prerogatives with re-
spect to being an advocate for a client.' 8 Outside of litigation
practice, the line between what is and what is not the practice
of law has become even more blurred. 19 It is not always clear
what makes a document "legal" or how much editorial work in
the preparation of a document constitutes drafting.20 Nor is it
altogether clear whether documents prepared by lawyers and
later modified or recommended by unlicensed practitioners
should fall within the ambit of practicing law.21
The concept of advising pushes any meaningful distinction
between legal and nonlegal work almost to absurdity. In a rule-
based society where every form of human activity has legal im-
plications and virtually all forms of advice have some legal ele-
ments, it would be futile to suggest that only lawyers could give
advice with a legal component. 22 If not all advice with a legal
element is legal advice, then where do we draw the line between
15. See UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK: A COMPILATION OF STATUTES,
CASES AND COMMENTARY ON THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 171-77 (Justine
Fischer et al. eds., 1972) [hereinafter UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK].
16. See id. at 169-70.
17. See Sperry v. State ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385-402 (1963). See
generally Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 45.
18. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 49-50
(1996).
19. See Linda Galler, When Lawyers Work for Accounting Firms, N.Y. Prof.
Resp. Rep. 4 (Feb. 1999). This problem was addressed by the author in the context
of ancillary business activities by lawyers. See Gary A. Munneke, Dances with
Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
559, 562 (1992).
20. In an era where word processors regurgitate and reuse legal documents,
the authorship of specific language is often uncertain. See Munneke, supra note
19, at 570.
21. See Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1978), where the
owner of a form preparation service was prosecuted for unauthorized practice of
law and it was held that there is no unauthorized practice where the service
merely filled in blanks on forms and did not give legal advice.
22. See Justice, supra note 5, at 180.
[Vol. 20:73
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what is legal advice and what is not? Is it that the advice is
predominantly legal? Is it that the advice was given by a per-
son trained in the law? Is there some arbitrary rule that sets
the limit? There is no simple answer to these questions, but the
fact that there is no answer suggests that such lack of definition
invites others besides lawyers to offer legal advice.
Accountants have taken advantage of this uncertainty by
reading the definition of legal advice narrowly and construing
advisement broadly. 23 Particularly with respect to tax matters,
accountants argue that the interpretation of tax statutes is an-
cillary to the provision of accounting services. 24 Recently, ac-
countants have pressed to extend clients' right to privileged
communication to cover accountants representing clients in tax
court.25 Such a privilege makes utilization of accountants into a
true alternative to hiring lawyers in tax cases.
Accounting firms, especially large national practices, have
recognized that their clients typically encounter a variety of
business-related problems, particularly in the field of what
could be called "business planning."26 The notion of "one-stop
shopping" for professional services is not a new one, but it has
proved to be an appealing approach to accounting firms, which
have broad national client bases and seek to expand the scope of
firm services to include a wider range of activities.27 Whether
they are described as consulting services or planning services,
the upshot is the same: at least some of the work that might
have been characterized as legal in former days is siphoned off
to accountants and other professionals who define the scope of
their services more broadly.28
Outside the United States, American restrictions on the
ownership of law firms do not apply, and accounting firms have
23. See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 44.
24. See Galler, supra note 19, at 4; see also Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 45.
25. Section 3411 of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform
Act of 1998 added Section 7525 to the Internal Revenue Code, creating a privilege
similar to the attorney-client privilege between CPAs and other federally author-
ized tax practitioners and their clients.
26. See Arash Mostafavipour, Law Firms: Should They Mind Their Own Busi-
ness?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 435, 436-37 (1998).
27. See New York State Bar Association, Report of Special Committee on
Multi-Disciplinary Practice and the Legal Profession 7 (1999).
28. See Justice, supra note 5, at 192-93.
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been even more aggressive through the acquisition of ownership
interests in law firms.29 Such amalgamated service providers
now can offer both legal and nonlegal services to their clients. 30
Many observers of the legal profession in the United States be-
lieve that accounting firms secretly covet a significant role in
the provision of legal services. 31 Some lawyers are aware of the
accountants' agenda and have manned the barricades to keep
out these invaders. 32 This is not an idle concern. Just as a "full-
service" law firm can market a broad scope of services to poten-
tial clients and cross-market its services to current clients, "full
service" professional service firms can offer clients "one-stop
shopping" for their professional service needs.33
Ironically, it was not too many years ago that the American
Bar Association ("ABA") engaged in a cathartic debate about
whether law firms could own ancillary nonlegal businesses.34
After numerous starts and stops, the ABA adopted Model Rule
5.7, which permitted ancillary business ownership by law firms,
provided they took steps to assure that other ethical responsi-
bilities likely to be threatened by ancillary business activities
would be protected. 35 The District of Columbia Bar went so far
29. See Morello, supra note 8, at 250.
30. See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 44.
31. "The naysayers, led by Lawrence Fox, claim that the Big Five accounting
firms have manufactured the demand for integrated services. They would have us
believe that the Big Five woke up and said, 'let's start practicing law,' but no cli-
ents are driving this demand." John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Proposal
on MDPs Goes Overboard, TEx. LAW., Aug. 9, 1999, at 38, 38.
32. From the beginning of the multidisciplinary practice debate, some lawyers
have advocated an aggressive campaign to stop accountants from encroaching on
lawyers' turf. See id.; Letter from Jay G. Foonberg, Delegate at Large, American
Bar Association, to the Members of the American Bar Association House of Dele-
gates (January 8, 1999) (on file with author).
33. The concept of multidisciplinary practice contemplates a team of profes-
sionals with differing skills who work collectively when necessary to solve
whatever problem the client may have. The term 'one-stop shopping" seems to
refer to modern superstores that displace a variety of specialized merchants.
34. See American Bar Association, A Legislative History: The Development of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1982-1998, 268-69 (1999).
35. RULE 5.7 RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING LAW-RELATED
SERVICES
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct with re-
spect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in paragraph (b), if
the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the lawyer's
provision of legal services to clients; or
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/5
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as to make joint ownership of a law firm by lawyers and
nonlawyers permissible under Rule 5.4 of its Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.36 The passage of these rules does not seem to
have generated widespread changes in the way law is practiced,
either in the District of Columbia or the United States.
While opening the door to lawyer ownership of nonlegal
businesses, the ABA has been much less amenable to nonlawyer
ownership of law firms.3 7 Thus, it is still improper for a lawyer
to share fees with a nonlawyer, enter into a partnership with a
nonlawyer if any of the activities involved constitutes the prac-
tice of law, or allow a nonlawyer to influence the lawyer's in-
dependent professional judgment.38 It seems, at least according
to lawyers' rules, that a law firm can own an accounting firm,
but not vice versa.
(2) by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer individually or with
others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable measures to assure that a
person obtaining the law-related services know that the services of the
separate entity are not legal services and that the protections of the cli-
ent-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term "law-related services" denotes services that might reasonably
be performed in conjunction with and in substance are related to the provi-
sion of legal services, and that are not prohibited as unauthorized practice of
law when performed by a nonlawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.7 (1999).
36. (b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organi-
zation in which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exer-
cised by an individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which
assist the organization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing
legal services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial
interest undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in
the partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the non-
lawyer participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were
lawyers under Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
District of Columbia RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1999).
37. Although Model Rule 5.7 opened the door to law firm ownership of non-
legal businesses, Model Rule 5.4 continues to prohibit ownership, or even invest-
ment in legal businesses by non-lawyers. Economic protectionism rather than eth-
ics may explain the disparate treatment. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in
the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 615 (1989).
38. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1999); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102, DR 3-103 (1999).
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In the past, the ABA and various professional groups cre-
ated voluntary inter-professional agreements that attempted to
define the limits of their respective practices.39 These agree-
ments are not currently published or distributed by the ABA or
state bar associations. The inter-professional accords represent
an institutional attempt to address the question of appropriate
limitations on law-related activities by other professionals.
Whether or not professional associations could or would reach
similar answers today is a moot point since further discussions
are unlikely to occur.40
While these agreements never had a binding effect on law-
yers and other professionals, they have little or no force today.
Although the agreements have not been formally abrogated by
the ABA, they have become virtually ignored in the legal com-
munity. Given the two or more decades that have elapsed since
these agreements were last reviewed and the changes in law
and other professional fields during this period, there is serious
doubt that such accords would provide meaningful guidance in
today's marketplace. 41 This seems to suggest that lawyers and
accountants will find little common ground in the accords to
help resolve their differences.
In many jurisdictions, unauthorized practice committees,
which flourished in the 1930s and 40s, have been disbanded or
de-emphasized by the bar. The primary focus of the ABA's cur-
rent unauthorized practice initiatives is in the area of legal
practice by paralegals. 42 In California, for instance, the legisla-
ture has considered a bill permitting licensed paralegals to per-
39. See New York State Bar Association, supra note 27, at 7. These compacts
appeared annually in the Martindale-Hubbell Directory from the early 1950s
through the early 1970s when they fell into disuse. See also CHARLES W. WOLF-
RAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.1, at 825-26 (Student ed. 1986).
40. The ABA has not pressed for renewal of the compacts during either the
ancillary business or MDP debates, perhaps out of concern that cooperation might
be treated as price fixing or monopolistic activity under the Sherman Antitrust
Act. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
41. The possibility exists that any effort by the legal and accounting profes-
sions to carve up the tax business would constitute a restraint of trade in violation
of antitrust regulations. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1977)).
42. See generally Debra Baker, Is This Woman a Threat to Lawyers?, A.B.A.
J., June 1999, at 54.
[Vol. 20:73
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol20/iss1/5
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
form certain routine legal services in competition with
lawyers.43
As for the immediacy of the paralegal problem, lawyers
tend to fixate on short term issues. For the short term, parale-
gals in many jurisdictions have been pressing for the right to
perform routine legal work that involves basically low-level
legal judgment, such as filling out forms, especially in areas
that lawyers have more or less abandoned as uneconomical. 44
Since a great many community colleges and some four-year col-
leges offer paralegal degrees, thousands of paralegals graduate
without law-related employment, which exerts increasing pres-
sure on the marketplace to expand the scope of activities parale-
gals are permitted to perform and, at the same time, curtail
lawyers' professional monopoly.45 Current dissatisfaction with
lawyers and legal fees also contributes to this movement. 46
The ABA is a voluntary association of lawyers and, there-
fore, its actions are not binding on either state bar associations
or on state courts that regulate lawyers' conduct.47 The immedi-
acy of the paralegal problem, the general economic environ-
ment, and the potential for antitrust violations are three basic
reasons for the shift in emphasis away from cooperation with
other professional groups about the limits of a professional
practice. Prosecutions for unauthorized practice involve obvi-
ous attempts by nonlawyers to perform legal services, rather
than for activities such as answering legal questions in the con-
text of a professional setting.48
A healthy economy may help to explain the lack of atten-
tion paid by the bar to unauthorized practice in the 1990s. His-
torically, the most vigilant efforts by lawyers to enforce the
professional monopoly coincided with the years of the Great De-
pression, when business activity was perpetually sluggish and
everyone was scraping for any work they could find just to stay
43. See Justice, supra note 5, at 204.
44. In California, when the state legislature considered a bill authorizing lim-
ited practice by paralegals, the argument was made that the paralegal would be
doing work that lawyers did not want. See Justice, supra note 5, at 202.
45. See generally id.
46. See id. at 184 n.23.
47. See WOLFRAM, supra note 39, at § 2.6, at 57 n.50.
48. See, e.g., N.Y. JuD. LAw §§ 476, 478, 484 (McKinney 1983).
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afloat.49 It is not surprising that the legal profession sought to
enforce its prerogatives more during this period than it does to-
day. Some commentators speculated that the oversupply of
lawyers and a downsizing of the United States economy in the
early 1990s triggered the most recent round of economic protec-
tionism by the bar.50
Other than periodic debates such as those surrounding the
adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the an-
cillary business battle, there is little evidence of support for a
reinvigorated unauthorized practice effort targeting other pro-
fessionals.51 If anything, a blurring of the lines between what is
legal work and what is not will result in both lawyers and
nonlawyers working both sides of the fence. Also, because the
likelihood of harm caused by nonlawyer professionals dealing
with legal questions in the context of their own professional ex-
pertise is small, there is little incentive to prohibit conduct that
does not produce tangible injury to members of the public.
In the final analysis, the biggest single factor impeding ag-
gressive measures aimed at unauthorized practice by the bar is
the potential for antitrust liability. 52 This position was force-
fully made in the two leading articles on the subject by Barlow
Christensen and Deborah Rhode. 53 In her article, Professor
Rhode cogently dismantles the arguments in favor of anticom-
petitive practices and supports a deregulated marketplace in
which lawyers do not have a monopoly on legal services. 54
Although courts have continued to exercise their inherent
power to exclude unlicensed practitioners from engaging in ac-
tual legal representation, drafting, and advising, bar associa-
tions have tended to take Rhode's advice and back off.55
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 2, TITLE B
(Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Apr. 6, 1998); see generally Christensen, supra note 2,
at 160.
50. See CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN 1995 1-3 (1999). See also American Bar Association, Legal Educa-
tion and Professional Development - Education Continuum Report of the Task
Force on Law Schools and the Legal Profession: Narrowing the Gap 13-18 (1992).
51. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 9.
52. See id. at 54-55.
53. See Christensen, supra note 2, at 160; Rhode, supra note 2, at 54-55.
54. See Rhode, supra note 2.
55. See id. at 15.
[Vol. 20:73
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What does all of this mean? The shorter answer is that law-
yers now find themselves in a highly competitive, largely unreg-
ulated marketplace. Past attempts to limit the activities of
other professional groups, while subject to legitimate criticisms,
represent a rational effort to define the limits of the practice of
law. The rules were developed at a time when attention to the
question of what constitutes the practice of law was being dis-
cussed actively by both lawyers and nonlegal professional
groups. It would be a mistake to think that we could learn
nothing from the professions' leaders of a generation ago. 56 De-
spite significant change, many elements of the practice of law,
as well as the fundamental relationships with other professions,
have not changed. Legal practice still involves giving advice to
clients on the meaning, interpretation and enforcement of the
common, statutory and regulatory law; drafting and executing
legal instruments for clients; and representing clients in judi-
cial proceeding.57 There has never been any real dispute about
whether the practice of law included these fundamental serv-
ices, or whether the state, through the judicial branch, can de-
limit a monopoly to certain individuals licensed to carry on such
activities.58
The debate has always occurred at the fringes. 59 Are ad-
ministrative hearings like judicial proceedings? Is answering a
question with legal implications giving legal advice? Is the
preparation of standard forms the same as drafting documents?
Are basically ministerial activities such as transferring title to
property the same as representing a party in a real estate
transaction? Earlier case law, bar ethics opinions, and the
agreements between lawyers and other organizations all
demonstrate how futile it is to attempt to draw lines and create
rules that provide meaningful guidance over time. The legal
56. The unauthorized practice cases prior to 1970 provide interesting insight
into the fundamental components of the practice of law. See Sperry v. Florida ex.
rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Smith v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Missouri,
336 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1960); Florez v. City of Glendale, 463 P.2d 67 (Ariz. 1969) (in
banc).
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 2, TITLE B (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 2, Apr. 6, 1998).
58. See WOLFRAM, supra note 39, at § 16.2.2, at 880-83.
59. The fringes of the practice of law include those activities where the legal
component is a small percentage of total service.
1999]
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literature is replete with hundreds of cases that make fine dis-
tinctions on points that provide little insight to the contempo-
rary reader.60
For example, in the area of title insurance and real estate
transactions, there appear to be considerable differences from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 61 In some states, title companies
have all but driven lawyers out of the real estate closing busi-
ness, at least with respect to fairly simple residential transac-
tions.62 For high stakes matters, it is still the case that the
parties utilize independent legal representation. 63 Since the ti-
tle company does not actually represent a party to the transac-
tion-it is merely making a business decision to issue title
insurance - buyers and sellers who want their legal interests
protected inevitably seek a lawyer. In some states, lawyers
have managed to keep the title companies at bay,64 and in still
others, lawyers and title companies coexist uncomfortably. 65 In
these states it is not uncommon for a lawyer to own a title com-
pany and to funnel routine transactions through the title com-
pany, sometimes while representing other clients directly.
However there is no requirement that title companies be owned
or operated by legally trained individuals. 66
One problem for any provider of real estate settlement serv-
ices, whether a lawyer or not, is that land records are main-
tained in the county where the land is located, which makes it
difficult for non-local providers to review titles efficiently. 67 A
local law firm or title company can review the land records from
the date of the last transaction in which title was reviewed by
that provider, rather than going back to the original grant of
the property, which can sometimes be decades or more. Out-of-
60. See UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 196-213.
61. See Michael Braunstein, Structural Change and Inter-Professional Com-
petitive Advantage: An Example Drawn from Residential Real Estate Conveyanc-
ing, 62 Mo. L. REV. 241, 259 (1997).
62. See Quintin Johnstone, Land Transfers: Process and Processors, 22 VAL.
U. L. REV. 493, 501 (1988).
63. See Braunstein, supra note 61, at 259.
64. See id. at 261-63.
65. See id.
66. See Munneke, supra note 19, at 562 n.ll.
67. Not only are the records physically inaccessible, a problem that may be
eliminated with on-line records, but local lawyers are more likely to know the land
ownership history than lawyers from outside the area.
[Vol. 20:73
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county providers are also ill-positioned to develop referral net-
works with realtors who can refer buyers and sellers to them for
services. Although the computerization of court records will
eventually revolutionize the process of searching titles and the
accessibility of information, it undoubtedly will continue to be
problematic for any non-local provider to compete effectively for
this kind of business for at least another ten years.
Another problem with real estate closings is that the settle-
ment agent, whether lawyer or title company, must have a rela-
tionship with a title insurer.68 Thus, when an agent concludes
that title to a property can be transferred, it is common practice
to issue a title insurance policy rather than to self-insure
against errors or omissions.69 The title insurer guarantees the
title against defects and assumes the risk that the title cannot
be defended successfully.7 0 What this means for anyone consid-
ering expanding into this area is that it will be necessary to es-
tablish a relationship with a title insurer that will issue title
policies reviewed by the provider.
The field of trusts presents a separate but similar set of
problems. There, banking and trust institutions have tradition-
ally managed trust accounts, either deposited in their institu-
tions or separate designated trust assets.71 Traditionally, the
work of drafting trust instruments has been the exclusive pur-
view of lawyers. 72 There are several reasons for this division of
responsibility. Most prominently, legal drafting activities are
widely viewed as a part of the practice of law, so such drafting
by a nonlawyer would constitute unauthorized practice. 73 Even
if the bank employed lawyers to draft trust instruments, the
prevailing view is that the bank itself, not the individual law-
yer, is practicing law. 74
68. See Braunstein, supra note 61, at 247-49.
69. See id. at 248.
70. See id.
71. The financial institution is often well positioned to administer trusts,
given the nature of banking activities. Banks do not, however, have a monopoly
over trust administration. The trustee may be an individual such as a lawyer or
relative of the creator of the trust, or an institutional trustee such as a bank.
72. See UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 184-88.
73. See id.
74. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1910); Lawline v. Ameri-
can Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992).
1999]
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
The prohibition against corporations practicing law was up-
held as recently as 1992 in Lawline v. American Bar Ass'n.75
This case discusses all the problems that are traditionally iden-
tified with the unauthorized practice of law and purports to
keep the barbarians away from the lawyers' frontier. In the
real world, undoubtedly, many banks are using in-house law-
yers to draft trust instruments, and other organizations are
looking for ways to provide legal services to their clients as part
of a larger package of services. Perhaps it is safer to have in-
house lawyers prepare initial drafts of instruments, which are
then reviewed by outside counsel, than to try to provide services
to clients directly, but the additional review obviously drives up
the cost of the service with little marginal increase in value to
the client.
The second more serious problem associated with nonlegal
entities providing legal services is that a conflict of interest
arises when the drafter of an instrument is also named as a
trustee, or otherwise benefits from the transaction, particularly
when a substantial fee is involved. 76 If a fiduciary relationship
exists between the service provider and the client, the responsi-
bility owed to the client by the fiduciary is higher than the ordi-
nary duty of care.77 A lawyer involved in such a transaction has
a clear duty to ensure the transaction is fair to the client, to
explain the nature of the conflict to the client, to secure the cli-
ent's informed consent, and to advise the client that he has the
right to seek independent counsel. From the standpoint of
many nonlegal service providers, it is less problematic to use
independent counsel for drafting purposes in most
circumstances.
75. 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992).
76. RULE 1.8(c) CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED TRANSAC-
TIONS
"A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person re-
lated to the lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a
client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the
donee."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(c) (1999). The act of naming
the maker of the instrument as trustee or executor could be viewed as making a
gift in contravention of this rule, because a benefit is conferred on the attorney
without further consideration.
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13, 14B (1957); see also WOLF-
RAM, supra note 39, at § 8.12.4, at 488-89.
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The area of corporate formation services is much more diffi-
cult to address because no single professional group represents
corporate formation providers. Books on corporate formation
have been held to be protected First Amendment expression,
and, therefore, beyond the regulatory pale.7 Services that sim-
ply fill in the blanks in corporate formation kits may raise un-
authorized practice issues.7 9 However, as long as the providers
do not advise the incorporators on matters such as corporate
form, structure, governance, ownership or other legal matters,
they probably can avoid criticism.80 These services are really
not much more than typing services. Most incorporations that
utilize kits or services are small businesses with limited owner-
ship and capital. Any new publicly held company almost neces-
sarily has to use a law firm because of the complexity of the
issues involved.
Whether a nonlegal professional firm could engage in more
sophisticated incorporations is another matter. Such an effort
would almost certainly raise the ire of a powerful segment of the
practicing bar and would undoubtedly end up in litigation. Pro-
fessor Rhode suggests that efforts to enforce the professional
monopoly in areas such as this are unlikely to be successful.8'
It is not entirely clear, however, what the outcome of litigation
in specified areas such as trust drafting would be.
The strongest reason to exclude nonlawyers from a law-re-
lated activity is that the public will be disserved or harmed if
those services are performed by individuals not licensed to prac-
tice law. However, in situations where the work is performed
by a member of another profession whose standards are compa-
rable to those applied to lawyers and are imposed by the state
or the profession itself, the risk of harm is significantly reduced.
Additionally, the specter of malpractice for violating the profes-
sional standard of care serves as a disincentive to undertaking
cases beyond the provider's knowledge or experience.
78. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc. 179 F.3d
956 (5th Cir. 1999).
79. See Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1978), discussed
supra note 21.
80. See id.
81. See generally Rhode, supra note 2.
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For instance, in a property settlement, the closing agent
should recognize that a serious boundary dispute or cloud on
the title may necessitate the involvement of lawyers in the case.
Failure to refer the case to a lawyer, by either passing the title
or trying to cure the defect, would subject the agent to liabil-
ity.8 2 In the trusts area, there is a potential conflict between
instrument drafting and trust administration, the former
presenting more obvious unauthorized practice problems than
the latter. With the corporate formation situation, since there
is no clear nonlegal profession that ordinarily provides such
services and most incorporations involve more than completing
technical filing requirements, a nonlegal provider would under-
take substantial risk to provide such services.
The keys for any organization seeking to provide law re-
lated services, such as those in the examples above, are the
same. First, the client should be advised about the scope and
nature of the representation and the fact that the service does
not contemplate the provision of legal services.8 3 Second, the
client should be advised that he has the right to seek legal coun-
sel to represent his interests at any time during the representa-
tion.8 4 Third, the provider should obtain the client's written
informed consent to the representation.8 5 Fourth, at any time
during the representation if it appears to the provider that the
client ought to have independent counsel, the provider should
82. Under general professional liability principles, a service provider may be
liable for undertaking a matter for which he or she lacks the requisite skills, thus
causing harm to a customer. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (5th ed. 1984).
83. This responsibility is reflected in the lawyer's duty to advise the client of
the scope and limitations on the representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1999). A financial institution following this precept
might advise the client that it is not practicing law or giving legal advice and dis-
close its financial interest in the matter.
84. Under the Model Rules, a lawyer who has a personal interest in a transac-
tion must advise the client of the client's right to obtain legal counsel in the trans-
action. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 (1999). A parallel
responsibility for institutions that prepare trust documents would clarify the non-
legal nature of the drafting.
85. Following the Model Rules, the nonlegal provider should advise the client
about any limitations. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(c),
1.7(b) (1999).
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refer the client to legal counsel.8 6 Fifth, if the client waives the
right to utilize legal counsel, the provider should nevertheless
withdraw from the matter if legal issues emerge that would
clearly require the exercise of legal judgment.8 7
There are circumstances in which the nonlegal service pro-
vider ought to defer to a licensed lawyer. First, the representa-
tion of the client before any court, legislative or administrative
body should always be handled by a lawyer except where spe-
cific legal exceptions have been established (as in tax prac-
tice).88 Second, the drafting of all instruments having legal
force and effect should be drafted by legal counsel.8 9 The extent
to which modifying a pre-existing document represents legal
drafting is unclear, but as a rule, where the change affects the
legal relationship among the parties, it is more likely to be
viewed as legal drafting. Third, when the client seeks advice
involving the interpretation of statutory or case law, if the legal
questions involved are complex, or the law is unsettled on a par-
ticular issue, then the nonlegal provider should step aside in
favor of a lawyer.90
These policies should be spelled out in writing, and any per-
sonnel of a provider of law-related services, who will be involved
in transactions in these areas, should receive training to iden-
tify problem situations. When questions arise involving the ap-
plication of these policies, the individual involved should
maintain accurate records of events. There should also be some
resource in-house or on retainer to advise the provider about
how to handle close calls. Procedural safeguards may not elimi-
86. Just as Model Rule 1.8 establishes a requirement for lawyers in self-bene-
fitting transactions to obtain the client's informed consent to the representation,
banks or other trust preparers could protect themselves by obtaining their clients
informed consent.
87. The fiduciary nature of the trustee relationship would seem to call for any
trustee to refer the beneficiary to independent counsel if the interests of the
trustee and beneficiary become adverse.
88. See supra notes 17, 25 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 20, 55 and accompanying text.
90. Just as a lawyer should refer a client to another lawyer if the first lawyer
lacks competence, a nonlawyer trustee should refer a client to a qualified lawyer if
the legal issues are sufficiently complex. These three principles establish a general
division of responsibility for nonlegal professional service providers. The threat of
professional liability should serve as a deterrent to unqualified provision of legal
services.
1999]
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
nate the problems, but they can help to avoid serious mistakes,
and they can insulate the provider from criticism and possibly
liability after the fact.
Assuming that the concerns present when lawyers engage
in multidisciplinary practices - confidentiality, conflict of inter-
est, solicitation of business, and independent judgment - are
real, the dangers exist regardless of whether the organization is
a law firm, an accounting firm, a bank or some other entity.
Lawyers may argue that a lawyer at the top of the food chain
will be more interested in protecting lawyers' ethical responsi-
bilities than a nonlawyer in the same position, but this is not
always true. Lawyers already work in a number of settings
where nonlawyers exercise tremendous influence over the deci-
sions they make and the way the lawyers practice law. In-
house counsel in both corporate and government law offices typ-
ically are answerable to a nonlawyer supervisor. 91 Even private
practitioners who represent a single client, as well as lawyers
who work for group and indigent legal services programs are
often responsible to a nonlawyer board of directors. 92
The fact that our system has been able to accommodate this
kind of oversight by nonlawyers where expediency or the Con-
stitution seem to make it feasible raises questions about the
prohibition against nonlawyer involvement in legal business in
other settings. It would seem that the primary reason for
prohibiting such involvement is economic protectionism, rather
than ethical probity. 93
What all of this means for lawyers is that the barriers be-
tween the practice of law and other professional services are di-
minishing. Competition with other professional groups is
inevitable, and further inroads into the traditional work domain
of lawyers are probable. There is no doubt that the work we call
lawyering as provided by law firms today will continue. As long
as human beings live and work in close proximity within a com-
plex economic system for delivering goods and services to con-
91. By definition, institutional lawyers report to their employers, which are
nonlegal organizations. The lawyer in such an organization must exercise in-
dependent professional judgement despite the relationship with the organization.
92. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
93. See Rhode, supra note 2, at 54.
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sumers, there will be conflict, and that conflict will involve
interpretation of the law. What may not be so clear is what
types of organizations will be most well prepared to provide
those services.
Will law firms provide a very specific and narrow form of
problem solving described as legal services, or will they be in-
ternational, multi-professional service companies that deliver a
wide range of expertise and support to businesses that come to
them for assistance? Will a license to practice law remain a
ticket to engage in a judicially sanctioned monopoly in the pro-
fessional services area, or will it become a mere license to ap-
pear in court possessed by certain members of the professional
problem-solver community? Will law school graduates predomi-
nantly go to work as associates in traditional law firms, or will
they find better opportunities in banks, financial services com-
panies, and accounting firms? Will accounting firms and other
professional service delivery companies evolve into multi-pro-
fessional partnerships, or will they, too, remain hidebound to
their professional roots? Will law firms, especially large law
firms that compete for major corporate clients lose out in the
Darwinian war for economic survival, or will they take on some
of the trappings of their competitors to become multi-profes-
sional offices as well?
These questions give rise to considerable speculation, but
no clear answers as to where these developments will lead. Law
firms and the legal profession must address some fundamental
questions: law firms will need to reconsider the professional
values that have discouraged them from competing directly
with accounting firms and other service providers. The ques-
tion of ownership of law firms by nonlawyers will have to be
addressed, just as the question of law firm ownership of nonle-
gal businesses was addressed. The District of Columbia model 94
may be the more viable approach to the interdependent profes-
sional environment that lawyers will face in the next century.
Fee sharing limitations will also have to be changed. Lawyers
may want to look closely at situations likely to produce abuse,
while permitting lawyers to engage in business with other pro-
fessionals in ways they cannot today. A frontal assault on the
94. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
1999]
19
92 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:73
accounting profession is unlikely to be successful; lawyers and
law firms would be much wiser to expend their energy becoming
competitive rather than trying to prevent competition.
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